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Abstract
This paper develops a simple Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model capable of
evaluating the effect of large purchases of treasuries by central banks. The model exhibits imperfect
asset substitutability between government bonds of different maturities and a feedback from the term
structure to the macroeconomy. Both features are generated through the introduction of portfolio
adjustment frictions. As a result, the model is able to isolate the portfolio rebalancing channel of
Quantitative Easing (QE). This theoretical framework is employed to evaluate the impact on bond
yields and on the macroeconomy of the large purchases of medium- and long-term treasuries recently
carried out in the US and UK. The results from the calibrated model suggest that large asset purchases
of government assets had stimulating effects in terms of lower long-term yields, and higher output
and inflation. The size of the effects is nevertheless sensitive to the speed of the exit strategy chosen
by monetary authorities.
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1 Introduction
When an economy is stuck in a liquidity trap or experiences a liquidity shortage, the zero-lower bound
(ZLB) of interest rates may challenge the conventional ways of conducting monetary policy. Hence,
Quantitative Easing (QE) becomes one of the main tools at the disposal of central banks in order to spur
economic recovery. QE can be defined as all policies carried out by central banks involving changes
in the composition and/or size of their balance sheet aimed at, in a situation close to the ZLB, easing
liquidity and credit conditions with the final goal of stimulating the economic system. There exist there-
fore a variety of different unconventional measures that fall under the label of QE, such as purchases of
treasuries, purchases of private securities, and direct loans to banks, companies and households. Theoret-
ical and practical issues on unconventional monetary policies are discussed in several studies (Krugman,
1998; Svensson, 2003; Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004; Orphanides, 2004; Borio and Disyatat, 2010; Re-
ith, 2011; Bowdler and Radia, 2012; Joyce et al., 2012). Figure 1 sketches strategies and policy options
available to central banks facing the ZLB constraint as well as the channels through which they may
affect aggregate demand.
As the recent global downturn unfolded, many advanced economies experienced a serious liquidity
shortage combined with an interest rate close to the ZLB. Thus, their monetary authorities began to pur-
sue QE measures. In particular, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, interbank money markets froze up
due to some important bankruptcies (and, more generally, solvency concerns), a consequent widespread
lack of confidence, and coordination failures among market participants. As a result, financial markets
also broke down with dramatic consequences for the whole economic system. In an effort to spur eco-
nomic activity and restore financial market functioning, several central banks intervened by reducing the
short-term interest rate. The ZLB quickly became a serious concern for monetary institutions since, in
such situations, the availability of credit tends to become irresponsive to quantity of liquidity present in
the economic system.
In the US, when Lehman Brothers collapsed, the Fed engaged in dramatic cuts of the policy rate, and
the ZLB was virtually reached in December 2008. As Figure 2 shows, this measure was accompanied
by a huge expansion of the Fed’s portfolio assets, which jumped by over $1,000 billion in a few weeks.
Besides rescuing troubled companies, such as Bear Stearns and AIG, the Fed started a much more com-
prehensive program to provide liquidity and reduce risk premia along the term structure and across a
variety of different assets.1 Given improved conditions in financial markets, many of the programs intro-
duced at the onset of the crisis were suppressed by the end of 2009 or throughout 2010. A second stage
of QE, called by practitioners QE2 (in contrast with the first phase QE1), took place from October 2010
until June 2011, mainly consisting of purchases of medium- and long-term treasury securities.
1New specific programs included the Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) purchase program, which was intended to help
mortgage and housing markets, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, aimed at providing credit to households and
small companies, the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, which provided funding
to banks for their purchase of asset-backed securities, and the Term Auction Facility, which provided term funds to depository
institutions.
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In September 2012, Bernanke announced that the Fed will purchase additional agency mortgage-
backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month, and will extend the average maturity of its holdings
of securities. These actions are expected to increase the Fed’s holdings of longer-term securities by about
$85 billion each month until the end of the year. The declared objective of QE3 is to “put downward
pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial
conditions more accommodative.” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2012).
The QE approach of the Bank of England (BoE) was quite different to that implemented by the Fed.
As shown in Figure 3, a huge expansion of the balance sheet occurred just after the insurgence of the
crisis. During this first stage, the central bank implemented some liquidity support measures, such as
extensions to its lending operations, by allowing banks to borrow from a wider-than-normal range of
collateral. The second stage of unconventional measures in the UK began with the establishment of the
Asset Purchase Facility (APF) fund in March 2009, a separate subsidiary company of the BoE.2 The
goal of the APF was to improve market functioning by injecting money into the economy in the form of
purchases of high-quality public and private assets. However, APF’s operations were overwhelmingly
oriented towards purchases of medium- and long-term governments bonds (Figure 4). Private securities
accounted for a tiny proportion of the APF’s purchases. Because of further recessionary pressures during
the end of 2011, the Bank of England extended the program in October 2011, injecting additional liquid-
ity into the economy, mainly in the form of medium- and long-term gilt purchases. Two more waves of
purchases took place in February 2012 and July 2012, bringing the total amount of assets purchased by
the BoE to the remarkable value of £375 billion. At the time of writing this paper, a date for a definitive
exit strategy is still uncertain.
Recent events inspired a growing body of empirical literature trying to assess whether unconventional
monetary policies were successful. However, gauging the effects of unconventional monetary policies
remains a hard task. The reasons can be found both in the uncertain time lags between actions and
effects, and in the difficulties related to disentangling other important factors, especially government
policies and international developments. Another empirical concern is the identification of the channels
through which QE may affect yields, premia, and the macroeconomy. A substantial number of empirical
contributions rely therefore on event studies, i.e. they focus on the patterns of specific financial variables,
such as bond yields, within a narrow time interval between the announcement or the implementation of
a policy. Evidence provided by event studies is generally supportive of the effectiveness of QE policies,
both in the US (Klyuev et al., 2009; Blinder, 2010; Neely, 2010; Gagnon et al., 2011; Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Swanson, 2011; Glick and Leduc, 2012) and in the UK (Klyuev et al., 2009;
Meier, 2009; Joyce et al., 2011b; Glick and Leduc, 2012; Joyce and Tong, 2012).
Another strand of the empirical literature employs econometric techniques (Gagnon et al., 2011;
Meaning and Zhu, 2011; Bridges and Thomas, 2012; D’Amico et al., 2012; Glick and Leduc, 2012; Joyce
2The accounts of the APF are not consolidated with those of the central bank. Therefore, all the operations of the APF fund
fall inside the category “other assets” in Figure 3.
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and Tong, 2012; Kapetanios et al., 2012; Kozicki et al., 2012; Stroebel and Taylor, 2012; Wright, 2012;
Baumeister and Benati, 2013; D’Amico and King, 2013), affine term structure models (Christensen and
Rudebusch, 2012; Hamilton and Wu, 2012) and other finance models (Doh, 2010; Neely, 2010). These
works generally find that the unconventional monetary measures recently taken in the US and in the UK
were effective in affecting financial and macro variables.
In addition, more or less fully-fledged structural models are used to assess the impact of unconven-
tional monetary policies.3 In standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, QE
may only work through a signaling channel,4 since the representation of the financial sector is very styl-
ized. In order to capture the effects of QE policies via other channels, it is necessary to depart from the
conventional DSGE framework by introducing specific financial frictions and structures.
A first attempt is made by modeling financial intermediaries and banking frictions, in order to focus
on the role of unconventional monetary policies in facilitating lending. These models are able to capture
the credit channel of QE. Contributions in this area have been produced by Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010),
Dib (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Brendon et al. (2011), Del Negro et al. (2011), Gertler and
Karadi (2011), Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011), Chadha et al. (2012), and Chadha and Corrado (2012).
A different type of DSGE models features imperfect asset substitutability to isolate the portfolio
rebalancing channel of QE. In these frameworks, QE measures may affect asset prices and returns by
changing the relative supplies of different assets. There was recently a growing attention towards the
contributions by Tobin (1969, 1982) about imperfect asset substitutability, whose portfolio approach is
employed in dynamic optimizing models by Andre´s et al. (2004), Marzo et al. (2008), and, more re-
cently, by Falagiarda and Marzo (2012) and Zagaglia (2013). Chen et al. (2012) and Harrison (2012a,b)
adopt this framework to study unconventional monetary policies. In models with imperfect asset substi-
tutability, investors tend to rebalance their asset portfolios whenever the supply of the different types of
assets changes. Large asset purchases by the central bank vary the relative supply of assets of different
maturities, inducing movements in their prices. As a result, aggregate demand may also be influenced.
By embracing this last approach, this paper develops a DSGE model able to capture the effect of
large asset purchases of treasuries by central banks. Partially drawing on Chen et al. (2012) and Harrison
(2012a,b), the model is characterized by imperfect asset substitutability and a feedback effect from the
term structure to the macroeconomy, both generated through the introduction of portfolio adjustment
frictions. In other words, agents pay a cost whenever the preferred relative composition of their portfolio
deviates from its steady-state level. The model is therefore capable of isolating a portfolio rebalancing
channel of QE. By purchasing a particular asset, the monetary authority reduces the amount of that asset
held by private agents usually in exchange of risk-free reserves. As a result, the price of that asset
increases and the interest rate falls, creating favorable conditions for economic recovery through the
traditional monetary transmission mechanisms. Thanks to the general equilibrium nature of the model,
3For a comparison of the different DSGE approaches to QE, see Caglar et al. (2012).
4See, for example, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
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it is possible to assess the effect of this type of QE policies on the macroeconomy as well as on yields.
Differently from Chen et al. (2012) and Harrison (2012a,b), who employ perpetuities as long-term
bonds, the model presented in this paper features a secondary market for bond trading, as proposed by
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), allowing a straightforward treatment of zero-coupon government bonds
of different maturities. Moreover, unlike Chen et al. (2012) the present model relies on a representative
agent setting, avoiding the troublesome differentiation between restricted and unrestricted agents. A
further distinction between Harrison (2012b) and the model proposed in this paper is the absence of
portfolio adjustment frictions in the utility function of households. I instead decide to include such costs
more plausibly in the budget constraint. In addition, in contrast with previous studies, particular attention
is paid to the calibration strategy in order to simulate carefully large asset purchase programs, performing
a systematic analysis of the US and UK experiences. Lastly, an extensive sensitivity analysis is conducted
to show how the results crucially depend on the key parameters of the model. This model represents
a unique technique to evaluate the effects of large asset purchases within a relatively simple DSGE
framework characterized by: a) a representative agent; b) a stylized central bank’s balance sheet; c) an
endogenous term structure featuring imperfect asset substitutability between zero-coupon government
bonds of different maturities.
The theoretical framework is then employed to simulate the impact of large purchases of medium-
and long-term treasuries in the US during QE2 (from November 2010 to June 2011 - around $800 billion
of purchases - Figure 2), and in the UK during the first phase of the APF program (from March 2009 to
January 2010 - around £200 billion of purchases - Figure 3). The results from the calibrated model are
consistent with those obtained in the literature using different techniques. Overall, they suggest that large
asset purchases of government assets had substantial stimulating effects both in terms of lower long-term
yields and higher output and inflation. These effects seem to be generally larger for the UK than the
US. This is not surprising, given that the purchases characterizing the phases of QE under consideration
were relatively more sizable in the UK than in the US. Still, the difference in the effects between the two
countries is not as large as previously found in the literature. My baseline model specification indicates
that large asset purchases of QE2 in the US had a peak effect on long-term rates in annualized percentage
rates of -63 basis points, on the level of real GDP of around 0.92%, and on inflation of 0.37 percentage
points. In the UK, the baseline model specification suggests that the first phase of the APF program had
a peak effect on long-term rates of -69 basis points, on the level of real GDP of 1.25%, and on inflation
of 0.49 percentage points. However, the size of the effects crucially depends on the speed of the exit
strategy chosen by monetary authorities and on the degree of substitutability among assets of different
maturities.
All in all, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First of all, it provides a new and relatively simple
setting through which the effects of large purchases of treasuries by central banks can be evaluated
within a microfounded macro framework with optimizing agents. Second, it offers fresh evidence on the
potential effectiveness of the recent large asset purchase programs conducted in the US and in the UK.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates the model and introduces
its key features. Section 3 presents the results from the calibrated model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
A representative agent populates the economy and supplies labor inputs. Monopolistically competi-
tive firms hire labor and capital to produce differentiated goods. The government conducts fiscal and
monetary policy. Since the deviations from a canonical DSGE setting concern the households and the
government sectors, I start here with their discussion.
2.1 Households
There is a representative household, whose preferences are defined over consumption Ct, real money
balances MtPt and labor effort Lt, and are described by the infinite stream of utility:
Ut =
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
(1)
where β is the intertemporal discount factor. The instantaneous utility function u
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
is given by:
u
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
=
(Ct − γCt−1)1− 1σ
1 − 1σ
+
1
1 − χ
(
Mt
Pt
)1−χ
− Ψ
1 + 1/ψ
L1+1/ψt (2)
where γ measures the importance of consumption habits, σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
χ is the elasticity of money demand, and ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
In this economy, each agent i can choose the composition of a basket of differentiated final goods.
Preferences across varieties of goods have the standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form a`
la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977):
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct( j)
θ−1
θ d j
] θ
θ−1
(3)
where Ct is the aggregate consumption index of all the differentiated final goods produced in the economy
under monopolistic competition. There are j-th varieties of final goods ( j ∈ [0, 1]), and θ is the elasticity
of substitution between different final goods varieties (θ > 1).
Each agent is subject to the following budget constraint:
Bt
PtRt
+
BHL,t
PtRL,t
(1 + ACLt ) +
Mt
Pt
+ It(1 + ACIt ) =
Bt−1
Pt
+
BHL,t−1
PtRt
+
Mt−1
Pt
+ wtLt + qtKt −Ct − Tt (4)
Thus, agents allocate their wealth among money holding, accumulation of capital, which is rented to
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firms at the rental rate qt, and holding of two types of zero-coupon bonds (Bt and BHL,t), which are
purchased by households at their nominal price. They receive rental income qtKt, where Kt is capital,
wage income wtLt, where wt is the real wage. They also pay a real lump-sum tax Tt. It is investment,
and Pt is the aggregate price level.
Firms face quadratic adjustment costs of investment as in Kim (2000):
ACIt =
φK
2
(
It
Kt
)2
(5)
The law of motion of capital stock is expressed in the following standard way:
Kt+1 = It + (1 − δ)Kt (6)
where δ represents the depreciation rate of the capital stock.
The different zero-coupon government bonds are defined as money-market bonds Bt and long-term
bonds BHL,t (nominal value), whose yields are given, respectively, by Rt and RL,t (nominal price). Money-
market bonds are considered as a proxy for 3-month-maturity bonds, and the long-term bonds for 10-
year-maturity bonds.5 The budget constraint incorporates the secondary market for bond trading as
proposed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, p. 494-496). The strength of this approach is that it allows an
explicit and straightforward treatment of assets of different maturities. The left-hand side of the budget
constraint follows the usual formulation with bonds priced at their interest rates, since at time t, returns R
and RL are known with certainty and are risk-free from the viewpoint of agents. However, the right-hand
side of (4) reveals the presence of the secondary market for bond trading, according to which long-term
bonds are priced at the money-market rate. Even though these bonds represent sure claims for future
consumption, they are subject to price risk prior to maturity. At time t − 1, an agent who buys longer-
maturity bonds and plans to sell them next period would be uncertain about the gains, since Rt is not
known at time t − 1. As stressed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), the price Rt follows from a simple
arbitrage argument, since, in period t, these bonds represent identical sure claims to consumption goods
at the time of the end of the maturity as newly issued one-period bonds in period t. The variables Bt and
BHL,t should be considered as the household’s net holdings between periods t and t + 1 of bonds that each
pay a unit of consumption good at time t + j, without identifying when the bonds were initially issued.
As already mentioned, segmentation in financial markets is obtained by introducing portfolio adjust-
ment frictions, which represent impediments to arbitrage behavior that would equalize asset returns. In
particular, it is assumed that the intratemporal trading between bonds of different maturities is costly to
5However, in the calibration of the model, money-market bonds are assumed to include all government debt instruments
with maturity up to one year, whereas long-term bonds government debt instruments with maturity longer than one year (see
Paragraph 3.1).
7
each agent. These bond transaction costs are given by:
ACLt =
φL2
κL BtBHL,t − 1
2
 Yt (7)
where κL is the steady-state ratio of long-term bond holdings relative to short-term bond holdings
(
BHL
B
)
(variables without temporal subscripts represent the steady-state values). Thus, agents pay a cost when-
ever their preferred portfolio allocation between short and long maturity bonds changes. Transaction
costs are paid in terms of income and are zero in the steady-state.6
The rationale for including portfolio frictions is threefold. First of all, as stressed above, a justifi-
cation for including such portfolio frictions rests on the theory of preferred habitat, according to which
agents have preferences over bond maturities (Vayanos and Vila, 2009). Therefore, any deviation from
the preferred portfolio composition is costly to households. Second, these costs can be viewed as a proxy
for the behavior of agents towards liquidity risk (i.e. they rationalize a liquidity premium). The longer
the maturity of a bond, the less liquid is considered the asset, and vice versa. Since long-term bonds are
perceived as less liquid, there are liquidity costs associated with holding them. In other words, agents
perceive longer-maturity assets as riskier, and hence associated with a loss of liquidity compared to the
same investment in shorter-term bonds. It follows that, as they purchase longer-term bonds, they hold
additional short-term bonds to compensate themselves for the loss of liquidity. Thus, agents self-impose
a sort of “precautionary liquidity holdings” on their longer-term investments (Andre´s et al., 2004). Third,
these costs can also be considered as proxies for the shares of resources devoted to covering information
costs, or simply the costs of managing bond portfolios.
2.1.1 Optimality Conditions
Households maximize their lifetime utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (4) and the capital accumu-
lation equation (6). The first order conditions with respect to consumption, labor, money, money-market
bonds, long-term bonds, capital and investment, are respectively given by:
(Ct − γCt−1)−1/σ − βγEt(Ct+1 − γCt)−1/σ = λt (8)
ΨL1/ψt = λtwt (9)
(
Mt
Pt
)−χ
+ βEt
λt+1
pit+1
= λt (10)
6This distinctive formulation resembles those proposed by Andre´s et al. (2004), Falagiarda and Marzo (2012) and Harrison
(2012a,b).
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βEt
λt+1
pit+1
=
λt
Rt
+
κLφLλtYt
(
κL
bt
bHL,t
− 1
)
RL,t
(11)
βEt
λt+1
pit+1Rt+1
=
λt
RL,t
+
φLλtYt
(
κL
bt
bHL,t
− 1
)2
2RL,t
−
κLφLλtYtbt
(
κL
bt
bHL,t
− 1
)
bHL,tRL,t
(12)
β(1 − δ)Etµt+1 = µt − λt
qt + φK ( ItKt
)3 (13)
βEtµt+1 = λt
1 + 32φK
(
It
Kt
)2 (14)
where λt and µt are the two Lagrange multipliers.
2.2 The Government Sector
The consolidated government-central bank budget constraint is given by:
Bt
PtRt
+
BL,t
PtRL,t
+
∆t
Pt
=
Bt−1
Pt
+
BL,t−1
PtRt
+ Gt − Tt (15)
where BL,t is the total amount of long-term bonds present in the economy and Gt is government spending
net of interest expenses. As stressed in the previous paragraph, money-market bonds are considered as a
proxy for 3-month-maturity government debt assets, and long-term bonds for 10-year-maturity govern-
ment debt assets.
Drawing on Harrison (2012b), ∆t is defined as the change in the central bank balance sheet, equal to
money creation and net asset purchases:
∆t
Pt
=
Mt − Mt−1
Pt
−
 BCBL,tPtRL,t − B
CB
L,t−1
PtRt
 (16)
where BCBL,t is the central bank’s holdings of long-term government debt. Thus, the stylized central bank’s
balance sheet of this model includes long-term treasuries on the asset side and money on the liability
side. Central bank’s holdings of long-term government bonds are a fraction x of the total amount of
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long-term bonds present in the economy:
BCBL,t = xtBL,t (17)
The remaining proportion of long-term bonds is available to households and is given by:
BHL,t = (1 − xt)BL,t (18)
Thus, asset purchases by the central bank are performed by varying the fraction xt, which is modeled as
a variable following an autoregressive process of order one:
log
( xt
X
)
= φx log
( xt−1
X
)
+ εxt (19)
where X is the steady-state value of the fraction of long-term bonds held by the central bank
(
BCBL,t
BL,t
)
, and εxt
represents an i.i.d. shock to asset purchases with zero mean and standard deviation σx. This means that
the central bank holds in the steady-state a quantity of long-term bonds X, and temporary fluctuations
around this level are determined by (19). One limitation of this formulation is that the central bank is
assumed to gradually start decumulating long-term asset holdings in the period after the shock. The
persistence of the shock is nevertheless calibrated to mimic different plausible exit strategies conducted
by the monetary authority.
I introduce the following passive fiscal policy rule, according to which the total amount of tax col-
lection Tt is a function of total government’s liabilities:7
Tt = ψ0 + ψ1
[
bt−1
pit
− b
pi
]
+ ψ2
[
bL,t−1
Rtpit
− bL
Rpi
]
(20)
where ψ0 is the steady-state level of Tt, and bt and bL,t denote the real stock of short- and long-term
bonds (bt = Bt/Pt, bL,t = BL,t/Pt). Equation (20) suggests that the level of taxes reacts to deviations of
the outstanding level of public debt from its steady-state level. In other words, taxes are not allowed to
act independently from the stock of government liabilities outstanding in the economy.8 Notice that the
fiscal rule is passive as long as ψ1 + ψ2 > β−1 − 1.
The central bank is the institution devoted to set the money-market rate Rt, according to the following
Taylor (1993) rule:
log
(Rt
R
)
= αR log
(Rt−1
R
)
+ (1 − αR)
(
αpi log
(
pit
pi
))
(21)
7In such a way, it is possible to prevent the emergence of inflation as a fiscal phenomenon (Leeper, 1991).
8A similar formulation has been employed, for instance, by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
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where αR and αpi indicate the response of Rt with respect to lagged Rt and inflation. Thus, the policy
rate is determined by the deviation of inflation from its steady-state value with an interest rate smoothing
component.
Finally, the supply of long-term bonds is assumed to follow a simple exogenous AR process, as in
Zagaglia (2013):
log
(
bL,t
bL
)
= φBL log
(
bL,t−1
bL
)
+ εBLt (22)
where εBLt is a disturbance term with zero mean and standard deviation σBL. Thus, asset purchase shocks
are assumed to affect only the composition of outstanding government liabilities.
2.3 Firms
The final step is to model the firms’ sector, which follows a quite standard representation. Each firm j
produces and sells differentiated final goods in a monopolistically competitive market. The production
function is a standard Cobb-Douglas with labor and capital:
Yt = AtKαt Lt
1−α − Φ (23)
where α is the share of capital used in production, At is technology, and Φ is a fixed cost to ensure that
profits are zero in the steady-state.
Firms’ optimizing process is constrained by nominal rigidities a` la Rotemberg (1982), i.e. firms face
quadratic price adjustment costs:
ACPt =
φP
2
(
Pt( j)
Pt−1( j)
− pi
)2
Yt (24)
Given the standard CES setting of equation (3), the demand function faced by each single firm j is:
Yt( j) =
[
Pt( j)
Pt
]−θ
Yt =⇒ Pt( j) =
[
Yt( j)
Yt
]− 1θ
Pt (25)
Thus, the demand function for each single good j is proportionally related to the general output level of
the economy, and negatively to the price of good j.
Following Kim (2000), the profit function for each firm j is:
PtΠt( j) = Pt( j)Yt( j) − PtwtLt( j) − PtqtKt( j) − PtACPt (26)
After employing (24) and (25) into (26), the maximization problem of each firm becomes fully dynamic:
each firm maximizes the expectation of the discounted sum of profit flows, given the information at time
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0:
Π0( j) = E0
 ∞∑
t=0
ρtPtΠt( j)
 (27)
where ρt is a stochastic pricing kernel for contingent claims, i.e. the discount factor of firms. Assuming
that each agent in the economy has access to a complete market for contingent claims, the discount
factors of households and firms are equal:
Et
ρt+1
ρt
= Etβ
λt+1
λt
(28)
Therefore, the necessary first order conditions of the maximization problem with respect to labor and
capital are given respectively by:
wt = (1 − α)
(
Yt + Φ
Lt
) (
1 − 1
eYt
)
(29)
qt = α
(
Yt + Φ
Kt
) (
1 − 1
eYt
)
(30)
where eYt is the output demand elasticity:
1
eYt
=
1
θ
{
1 − φP(pit − pi)pit + βφPEt
[
λt+1
λt
(pit+1 − pi)pi2t+1
Yt+1
Yt
]}
(31)
which measures the gross price markup over marginal cost. It is easy to check that manipulations of the
log-linearized version of (31) lead to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.
2.4 The Resource Constraint
The model is completed by specifying the resource constraint of the economy:
Yt = Ct + Gt + It(1 + ACIt ) + AC
P
t +
bHL,t
RL,t
(ACLt ) (32)
The total output of the economy is allocated to consumption, government spending, investment (com-
prehensive of capital adjustment costs), price adjustment costs, and a component related to portfolio
adjustment frictions.
2.5 Asset Markets: No Arbitrage and the Feedback
In order to appreciate the main features of the model, a deeper analysis of the simple asset market
structure is required. Combining the log-linearized version of the two first-order conditions for bond
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holdings, i.e. equations (11) and (12), yields:
R˜L,t = R˜t + A1EtR˜t+1 + A2Etλ˜t+1 − A3Etp˜it+1 − φLA4[b˜t − b˜HL,t] (33)
where Aı (ı = 1, 2, 3, 4) are convolutions of the parameters. Equation (33) reveals that the long-term
rate depends positively on the volume of long-term bonds held by private households, as desired, and
negatively on the volume of short-term bonds, because of the imperfect substitutability between the two
assets. Thus, asset purchases carried out by the monetary authority, by reducing the supply of long-term
bonds at the disposal of households, would lead to a reduction in the long-term yield, as stated by the
portfolio rebalancing channel of QE. Conversely, an increase in the relative supply of the more illiquid
asset (i.e. long-term bond) will bid up the spread between the more illiquid asset and the more liquid
asset. The intuition is that to get agents to accept the fact of holding a larger (smaller) fraction of short-
term bonds in their portfolio the spread between the two rates has to decrease (increase). Notice the role
of the transaction costs parameter φL that, by generating impediments to the arbitrage behavior of agents
that would equalize returns, determines the degree to which relative bonds holding movements affect the
long-term rate. When financial frictions are equal to zero, equation (33) boils down to the more usual
formulation:
R˜L,t = R˜t + A1EtR˜t+1 + A2Etλ˜t+1 − A3Etp˜it+1 (34)
in which a sort of expectations hypothesis holds, and the long-term rate is not affected by changes in the
relative holdings of bonds of different maturities.
An additional crucial feature of the model is the presence of a feedback channel from the term
structure to the macroeconomy. This can be observed by combining the log-linearized version of the first
order conditions for consumption (8) and short-term bonds (11), in order to obtain the Euler equation for
consumption, and employing then the first order condition of long-term bonds (12):
c˜t = A5Etc˜t+1 + A6Etp˜it+1 + · · · − A7R˜t − A8R˜L,t (35)
where Aı (ı = 5, 6, 7, 8) are convolutions of the parameters. Aggregate demand and, through general
equilibrium forces, all the macro variables are therefore affected by the entire simple term structure of
interest rate present in this model, and not only by the short-term rate as in standard DSGE frameworks.
The whole story behind the model can be summarized as follows. Long-term bond purchases by the
central bank alter the volumes of assets of different maturities, and hence returns (equation (33)), which,
in turn, stimulate the economy through standard general equilibrium mechanisms (equation (35)).
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3 The Results from the Calibrated Model
The model is employed to simulate the effects of specific QE programs in the US and in the UK.9
More specifically, I focus my attention on QE2 in the US (from November 2010 to June 2011 - around
$800 billion of purchases), and the first phase of the APF operations in the UK (from March 2009 to
January 2010 - around £200 billion of purchases). As already mentioned, both phases were characterized
exclusively by purchases of medium- and long-term government securities (Figure 2 and Figure 3).
Therefore, it is possible to assess their effects using the model proposed in this paper, implicitly assuming
that the announcement of such programs represented an unanticipated shock. I simulate the impact of
such programs using a calibrated version of the model.
Since the model cannot be solved analytically, I log-linearized it around the steady-state. I solved the
model using the MATLAB routine Gensys written by Christopher Sims.10 In what follows, calibration
issues are first discussed. I then analyze the results of the baseline model. Lastly, a sensitivity analysis is
performed, exploring the effects of varying the key parameters of the model.
3.1 The Calibration
The benchmark model is calibrated to match quarterly data over the decade prior to the financial crisis
of 2008. Table 1 and Table 2 report, respectively, some steady-state values and the chosen calibration
values for the standard parameters. Some parameters are chosen following previous studies and their
calibrated value is quite standard in the literature. Among them: the elasticity of substitution across
goods θ, set equal to 6 (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004); the habit formation parameter γ, set equal to
0.7 (Smets and Wouters, 2007); the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ, set equal to 0.5, which
implies a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2; the depreciation rate of capital δ calibrated to 0.025
(Christiano et al., 2005; Altig et al., 2011), which implies an annual rate of depreciation on capital equal
to 10 percent; the share of capital in the production function α, set to 0.36 (Christiano et al., 2005;
Altig et al., 2011); the parameter of the price adjustment cost φP, calibrated to 100 (Ireland, 2004); the
elasticity of real money balances χ, set equal to 7 (Marzo et al., 2008); the Frisch elasticity ψ, set equal
to 1.
The parameters of the fiscal and monetary policy rules are calibrated in a standard way, with the
exception of αR, which is chosen very close to one, in order to prevent the short-term rate from responding
to inflation/output changes (reflecting a situation close to the ZLB), and, at the same time, to avoid
indeterminacy.
Some of the steady-states are obtained from the data, or following previous studies. Output is nor-
malized to 1. The consumption-output ratio is set to 0.57. The share of the representative household’s
time endowment spent on paid work is set equal to 0.3. The steady-state value of the money-market
9As the model is a closed-economy, it is better suited to analyze the US experience.
10The codes are available upon request as well as the appendices reporting the deterministic steady-state and the equations
of the log-linearized model.
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rate is chosen identical for both countries, given the very similar recent trends of rates in the US and the
UK, obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data and the Bank of England Statistical Interactive
Database.
In order to simulate accurately the unconventional programs under consideration, the parameters
and steady-states related to the new mechanisms proposed in this paper should be carefully chosen.
Their values, reported in Table 3, are country-specific and significantly influence the impact of asset
purchase policies. The ratio of total debt to GDP, the ratio of debt at different maturities to total debt, and
the proportion of long-term debt held by households and the central bank, are obtained by combining
data from the OECD Statistical Database, the Federal Reserve Statistical Release, the Bank of England
Statistical Interactive Database, and the Bank of England APF Gilt Operational Results Dataset, and
taking their values as they were just before the asset purchase shock occurred. In particular, the total debt
on GDP (B + BL) is the ratio of the total amount of marketable government debt to GDP. Short-term debt
(B) includes money-market instrument plus bonds with maturity up to one year. Long-term debt (BL) is
calculated by subtracting the amount of short-term debt from the total amount of debt.11
Also, the standard deviation of the asset purchase shock should be carefully set. The magnitude of
the asset purchase shock is chosen equal to 1 for the US (i.e. there was an increase of 100% in the
long-term bonds held by the Fed during QE2), and 12 for the UK (i.e. the BoE increased its holding of
long-term treasuries by 1200% during the first stage of the APF operations).12
The two free parameters of the model, namely the persistence of the asset purchase shock φx and the
parameter of bond adjustment frictions φL, are not easily quantified. They are set equal, respectively, to
0.83, reflecting a medium-term exit strategy from QE (approximately six years after the asset purchase
shock), and 0.01, i.e. 1% of agents’ income is devoted to paying portfolio transaction costs. This
calibration is similar to that in Chen et al. (2012) (0.015), but diverges from those proposed by Andre´s
et al. (2004) (0.045), Harrison (2012a) (0.1), and Harrison (2012b) (0.09). I set a lower value for φL due
to the peculiar specification of portfolio adjustment costs in (7), which, being paid in terms of household’s
income, assume a slightly different interpretation with respect to the works mentioned above. In the next
paragraphs some sensitivity analysis on these parameters is conducted.
Finally, the values of the remaining parameters and steady-states are computed using the determinis-
tic steady-state solution.
3.2 The Impact of Asset Purchases
The model impulse responses to an asset purchase shock are shown in Figure 5 for the US and in Figure
6 for the UK. The red line refers to the baseline model. The impulse response functions are shown as
percentage deviations from the steady-state level. The magnitude of the simulated asset purchase shock
in the US is such that central bank’s long-term bond holdings double (left upper panel in Figure 5). This
11A debatable assumption behind this calibration strategy is that the two countries were in the steady-state when their central
banks intervened.
12See Figure 2 and Figure 3.
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reduces the amount of long-term bonds at the disposal of households by around 23 percent, a figure in
line with the empirical evidence. The reduction in long-term bond supply pushes down the long-term
rate by 47 basis points. Through the feedback mechanisms from the term structure to the macroeconomy,
output and inflation experience an increase of 0.69 percent and 0.28 percent, respectively. Notice that
the term premium decreases almost as much as the long-term rate, given that the short-term rate, being
constrained at the ZLB, is not allowed to move substantially.13
Figure 6 shows that the asset purchase shock in the UK leads to an increase of 1200 percent of
long-term bonds held by the central bank. As a result, long-term government bonds held by households
decrease by approximately 27 percent, leading to a reduction in the long-term rate of 69 basis points. The
positive effect on the macroeconomic variables is 1.25 percent for output and 0.49 percent for inflation.
Table 4 and Table 5 summarize these findings in annualized percentage rates in the Baseline row
of My calibrated model, reporting also analogous results obtained by previous studies using different
techniques. The results obtained from the calibrated version of the model proposed in this paper are
consistent with what was previously found in the literature. More precisely, for the US the effect on long-
term yield, output and inflation seems to be slightly larger than that obtained in other studies, whereas
for the UK slightly smaller. A comparison with Harrison (2012a), who employs a similar DSGE model,
reveals that the results of the present model are closer to the empirical evidence coming from empirical
studies, especially as far as inflation is concerned. A substantial part of the differences between my
results and those in Chen et al. (2012) and Harrison (2012a) can be ascribed to the presence of the budget
constraint with secondary market, which generates higher effects on output and inflation in response to
an asset purchase shock.14
Not surprisingly, given the different amount of assets purchased, the overall effect of large asset
purchases on the economy is found to be larger in the UK than in the US. However, this difference is not
as large as previously found in the literature.
In order to gain intuition about some of the key mechanisms at work in the model, it is useful to
conduct a sensitivity analysis exercise. In particular, in what follows I analyze what happens when
I change, first, the persistence of the asset purchase shock φx, and then the parameter relative to the
portfolio adjustment frictions φL.
3.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis: The Role of the Persistence of the Asset Purchase Shock
In the benchmark calibration, it is arbitrarily assumed that central banks, after purchasing long-term
assets, undertake a medium term exit strategy, i.e. they wind down the program over the following
six years by selling the assets accumulated during the QE phases. To illustrate how results change
when varying the length of the exit strategy, Figure 5 and Figure 6 plot the impulse response functions
13The term premium ξt is calculated as follows: ξt = RL,t − 1N
∑N−1
j=0 EtRt+ j Thus, the term premium represents deviations of
the long-term yield RL,t from the level consistent with the expectations hypothesis. It is assumed that the short-term rate Rt is a
proxy for the 3-month yield and the long-term rate RL,t for the 10-year rate. This implies that N = 40.
14The graphs regarding the model without the budget constraint with secondary market are available upon request from the
author.
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considering three different values of φx: the benchmark value (red line), a higher φx (0.88), which reflects
a longer exit strategy from QE of approximately eight years (green line), and a lower φx (0.76), which
corresponds to a faster exit strategy of around four years (blue line).
When the parameter relative to the persistence of the asset purchase shock φx increases, the persis-
tence of the response of the long-term yield increases as well, both for the US and the UK, while the
magnitude of the response does not change significantly. Importantly, as for the macroeconomic vari-
ables, not only the persistence of their response goes up, but also their impact effect. By contrast, a faster
exit strategy is associated with a lower effect on the macroeconomy. This is completely in line with what
is actually expected, since a longer exit strategy is likely to exert larger inflationary pressures, and a too
fast exit strategy to have instead marginal effects on the economy. The reason for that is the presence of
nominal rigidities, which lead firms to move their prices more (less) aggressively in response to a more
(less) persistent shock (Chen et al., 2012).
Moreover, inflation responds more strongly than output to changes in the length of the policy, a fact
consistent with the findings of Chen et al. (2012), and due to the presence, again, of nominal rigidities
such as price stickiness. In particular, when prices are more (less) flexible, one would expect a higher
(lower) response of inflation to asset purchase shocks. Chen et al. (2012) note that “... higher price
flexibility shifts the adjustment in response to asset purchase programs from GDP growth to inflation, by
making its process more front-loaded.”15
The quantitative effects of the simulated asset purchase shock in annualized percentage rates for the
different persistence values are reported in Table 4 and Table 5. For the US, the effect on output is in the
range of 0.66%-1.27%, while the effect on inflation is found to be in the range 0.23%-0.59%. For the
UK, the effect on output lies between 0.94% and 1.61%, and that on inflation between 0.30% and 0.73%.
While these findings confirm that the effectiveness of such unconventional monetary policies was more
pronounced in the UK than in the US, they also highlight that their effects are subject to the uncertainty
associated with the timing of the exit strategy from QE chosen by the monetary authority.
3.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis: The Role of Financial Frictions
As already noted, the magnitude of φL measures the extent of the impediments to the arbitrage behavior
of agents, and therefore the degree of imperfect asset substitutability between short- and long-term bonds.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 report the impulse response functions for the baseline case (red line), and the cases
with higher (0.02) and lower (0.005) portfolio adjustment costs (green and blue line, respectively).
As expected, higher frictions generate larger obstacles to the arbitrage behavior of investors, making
the two assets less substitutable. As a result, changes in the relative quantities of bonds held by house-
holds lead to a higher responsiveness of long-term yield. The macroeconomic effects are also amplified
when φL increases (and mitigated when φL decreases). UK variables seem to be less sensitive to changes
15A sensitivity analysis specifically conducted on φP confirms this statement. The graphs are not reported for the sake of
space, but are available from the author upon request.
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in the parameter φL in comparison with the US. A specific sensitivity exercise, whose results are not
reported here, shows that this is due to the different steady-state values of bond quantities between the
two countries. The results in annualized percentage changes for the different calibrations are contained
in Table 4 and Table 5.
Lastly, it is worth noting that when there are no frictions at all (φL=0), the two assets become perfect
substitutes and a reduction in the supply of long-term bonds does not generate any effect on yields and
on the macroeconomy, as agents can simply increase their holdings of short-term bonds by the same
amount. In such a case, the identification of the portfolio rebalancing channel of large asset purchases
would not be possible.
3.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis: Constrained vs Unconstrained Policy Rate
In order to simulate recent large asset purchases as realistic as possible, the baseline calibration outlined
in paragraph 3.1 imposes a constrained policy rate, i.e. the short-term interest rate is prevented from
reacting to macro developments. An interesting exercise consists in comparing the cases when the policy
rate is constrained and non-constrained. When the policy rate is allowed to follow a standard Taylor rule
(αR = 0.7), the effects of large asset purchases on the variables of interest are expected to be smaller. In
this case, the impact of large asset purchases is mitigated by the increase in the short-term rate due to
the prescriptions of the Taylor rule. In effect, the impulse response functions displayed in Figure 9 and
Figure 10 confirm this conjecture. Thus, the stimulus provided to the economy by the simulated asset
purchases by the Fed and the BoE is significantly larger in the presence of a constrained policy rate (solid
red line) than with a free policy rate (dashed black line). As stressed by Harrison (2012a), this provides
a motivation for the implementation of large asset purchases by the central bank when the policy rate is
constrained by the ZLB.16
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a DSGE model capable of evaluating some of the effects of large purchases
of treasuries by central banks. The model exhibits imperfect asset substitutability and a feedback from
the term structure to the macroeconomy, both generated through the introduction of portfolio adjustment
frictions. As a result, the model is able to isolate a portfolio rebalancing channel of QE. This framework
is employed to evaluate the effects of recent specific large asset purchase programs in the US and in the
UK. More specifically, the paper focuses on QE2 in the US (from November 2010 to June 2011 - around
$800 billion of purchases), and the first phase of the APF operations in the UK (from March 2009 to
January 2010 - around £200 billion of purchases). Both phases were characterized almost exclusively by
purchases of medium- and long-term government securities.
16A similar argument is discussed in Christiano et al. (2011), who show that the government-spending multiplier can be
much larger than one when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds.
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The simulation results of the calibrated model are plausible and generally consistent with those ob-
tained in the literature using different techniques. However, the estimated macroeconomic effect in the
US is found to be slightly larger than in previous studies, while in the UK a bit smaller. Overall, the
findings suggest that large asset purchases of government assets had substantial stimulating effects both
in terms of lower long-term yields and higher output and inflation in both countries. These effects seem
to be generally larger for the UK than for the US. This is not surprising, given that the size of asset pur-
chases characterizing the phases of QE under consideration was larger, in relative terms, in the UK rather
than in the US. More specifically, the baseline model specification indicates that large asset purchases
of QE2 in the US had a peak effect on long-term rates in annualized terms of around -63 basis points,
on the level of real GDP of 0.92%, and on inflation of 0.37 percentage points. In the UK, the baseline
model specification suggests that the first phase of the APF program had a peak effect on long-term rates
of -69 basis points, on the level of real GDP of 1.25%, and on inflation of 0.49 percentage points. The
empirical results are nonetheless subject to some uncertainty associated with the degree of substitutabil-
ity among assets of different maturities, and, more importantly, with the speed of the exit strategy chosen
by monetary authorities.
All in all, the most substantive contribution of this paper is to provide a new setting through which
the effects of large purchases of treasuries by central banks can be evaluated within a microfounded
macro framework with optimizing agents. This study points to further avenues for future research. First
of all, through the estimation of the model it would be possible to check whether actual data support the
theoretical framework. Moreover, the model can be easily extended in several directions, e.g. to include
an explicit and more structured central bank’s balance sheet, a wider term structure representation, or
different types of assets, such as corporate bonds. Lastly, it would be worth combining this framework
with those proposed by Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Brendon et al. (2011),
Del Negro et al. (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), which, by introducing financial intermediaries,
are able to capture the credit channel of QE.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Steady-state values of some variables
Notation Description SS value
Y Output 1 (norm.)
C Consumption-output ratio 0.57
I Investment-output ratio 0.23
T/Y Taxes-output ratio 0.1972
L/(1 − L) Ratio of market to non-market activities 0.3
R Gross money-market rate 1.010
Table 2: Benchmark calibration of some parameters
Notation Description Benchmark value
Preferences and technology
α Share of capital in the production function 0.36
β Intertemporal discount factor 0.994
σ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.5
χ Elasticity of money demand 7
ψ Elasticity of labor supply 1
γ Habit formation 0.7
θ Elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods 6
φP Price adjustment costs 100
Fiscal and monetary policy
ψ1 Fiscal policy response to short-term debt 0.3
ψ2 Fiscal policy response to long-term debt 0.3
αpi Monetary policy response to inflation 1.5
αR Monetary policy inertia 0.997
Table 3: Calibration values of the key parameters and steady-states
Notation Description US UK
φL Portfolio adjustment frictions 0.01 0.01
B + BL Total debt on GDP 0.496 0.542
B Total ST debt on total debt 0.188 0.052
BL Total LT debt on total debt 0.308 0.490
BHL LT debt held by households 0.250 0.479
BCBL LT debt held by the CB 0.058 0.011
σx Magnitude of the asset purchases 1 12
φx Persistence of the asset purchases 0.831 0.831
Notes: 1A persistence of 0.83 reflects an exit strategy of approximately 6 years.
Sources: The values are calculated by combining data from the OECD statistical database, the Federal Reserve
Statistical Release, the Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database, and the Bank of England APF Gilt Oper-
ational Results Dataset.
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Table 4: Estimated effect of the LSAP2 on the LT rate,1 output and inflation (US - annualized)
Total impact Peak impact Peak impact
Study Method on LT Rate on Output on Inflation
KVJ (2011)2 Event study/regressions -33 bp - -
D’Amico et al. (2012) Regressions -55 bp - -
Chen et al. (2012) DSGE model -30 bp3 0.4% 0.05%
Chung et al. (2012) FRB/US model -20 bp3 0.6% 0.1%
My calibrated model Specification
Baseline -63 bp 0.92% 0.37%
High persistence (φx = 0.88) -61 bp 1.27% 0.59%
Low persistence (φx = 0.76) -65 bp 0.66% 0.23%
Higher frictions (φL = 0.02) -77 bp 1.57% 0.75%
Lower frictions (φL = 0.005) -46 bp 0.50% 0.17%
Notes: 110-year Treasury yield. 2Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011). 3Effect on the risk premium.
Table 5: Estimated effect of the first phase of the APF on the LT rate,1 output and inflation (UK - annualized)
Total impact Peak impact Peak impact
Study Method on LT Rate on Output on Inflation
Glick and Leduc (2012) Event study -49 bp - -
Harrison (2012a) DSGE model -60 bp2 1.3% 0.13%
Joyce et al. (2011a) Event study -125 bp - -
Joyce et al. (2011b) SVAR - 1.5% 0.75%
Joyce et al. (2011b) Reduced form model - 1.5-2.5% 0.75-2.25%
Kapetanios et al. (2012) Time-series model - 1.5% 1.25%
Bridges and Thomas (2012) Time-series model - 2% 1%
My calibrated model Specification
Baseline -69 bp 1.25% 0.49%
High persistence (φx = 0.88) -66 bp 1.61% 0.73%
Low persistence (φx = 0.76) -71 bp 0.94% 0.30%
Higher frictions (φL = 0.02) -69 bp 1.31% 0.53%
Lower frictions (φL = 0.005) -68 bp 1.13% 0.41%
Notes: 110-year Treasury yield. 2 5-year rate.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Fed assets composition
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Source: Author’s elaboration on data from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release.
Figure 3: Evolution of BoE assets composition
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Figure 4: Cumulative BoE asset purchases by type (a) and cumulative gilts purchases by maturity (b)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Feb 2009 Feb 2010 Feb 2011 Feb 2012
£
 b
ill
io
n
s 
Private securities
Gilts
(a)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Feb 2009 Feb 2010 Feb 2011 Feb 2012
£
 b
ill
io
n
s 
25+ years
10-25 years
5-10 years
3-5 years
(b)
Source: Author’s elaboration on data from the Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database.
Figure 5: Impulse responses to the simulated Fed’s asset purchase shock when varying the persistence of the shock
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to the simulated BoE’s asset purchase shock when varying the persistence of the shock
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to the simulated Fed’s asset purchase shock when varying bond transaction costs
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to the simulated BoE’s asset purchase shock when varying bond transaction costs
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to the simulated Fed’s asset purchase shock: constrained vs unconstrained ST rate
0 5 10 15 20
0
50
100
150
Central Bank LT Bond Holdings
0 5 10 15 20
−30
−20
−10
0
Households LT Bond Holdings
0 5 10 15 20
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Long−term Rate
0 5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Output
0 5 10 15 20
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Inflation
0 5 10 15 20
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Term Premium
 
 
Policy rate constrained Policy rate non constrained
30
Figure 10: Impulse responses to the simulated BoE’s asset purchase shock: constrained vs unconstrained ST rate
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